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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IRENE ERICKSON,
~
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v

(

s.

Case No.
10914

ORAN L. BEARDALL,
)
Defend ant and. Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEl\IENT OF .THE KIND OF CASE
Appellant and Respondent entered into a stipula·
tion prior to a divorce. Appellant subsequently obtained
the divorce and said stipulation was accepted by the
Court and made a part of the Divorce Decree. The
stipulation provided among other things that the Ap·
pellant would pay three fairly large family obligations.
However, Appellant failed to make payments and then
filed for Bankruptcy, listing said three obligations in
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his bankruptcy petition. Plaintiff-Respondent sued lo
recover the amount of the payments.
The primary question invoked in this litigation
is whether or not the obligations covered by the stipulation and Divorce Decree would be a debt provable
in bankruptcy, or whether it would not be dischargeahle
under Section 17, Title 11, Section 35, U.S.C.A. (Federal Bankruptcy Act) for the reason that it was for
the maintenance or support of wife.

The case was tried before .Judge .Maurice Harding
of the Fourth Judicial District Court and Judgment
was granted to the Plaintiff-Respondent. The Court
in its Findings of Fact specifically found that said
obligations were for maintenance and support of Defendant-Appellant's wife, and were not provable debts
which would be dischargeable under Section 17 of the
Federal Bankruptcy Act.
From this Judgment the Defendant appealed.

RELIEl' SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks a reversal of the District Court
Findings of Fact and Judgment. Plaintiff seeks to ha Ye
the Findings of Fact and Judgment affirmed.
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STATE_MENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts as set forth in Appellant's
Brief is generally correct but lacks detail in many
material areas which should be brought to the attention
of the Court. Respondent, therefore, will make a more
detailed statement and set forth the Facts as developed
by both parties.
The Appellant and Respondent were married on
the 31st day of l\Iay, 1963, and lived together until
August, 1965. (Tr. p. 5, 31). Appellant brought two
minor children into the new family relationship, (Tr.
p. :Z5) and Respondent one. Respondent's son had a
heart condition and was unable to work. (Tr. p. 18).
They all lived in Respondent's home. (Tr. p. 31).
Respondent ·was a widow, age 47, at the time of
the marriage. She had been a housewife and had not
worked outside the home virtually all of her married
life, and had developed no employment skills to enable
her to obtain a worthwhile job. She lived on Social
Security and had savings in the approximate amount
of $4700.00. (Tr. p. 5, 16, 18). These savings were
completely depleted before the parties separated, and
i11 addition, three sizeable family obligations were incurred.
DiYorce proceedings were started by Appellant in
ihe latter part of August, 1965. In September, 1965, a
;,cttlement was worked out by Counsel for the parties,
and a stipulation executed (Tr. p. 5, 14), which prornled among other things as follows:
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Defendant in Divorce action (Respondent) was
to be awarded a 1965 Yaliant automobile which had an
unpaid indebtedness to Zions l<-..irst National Bank iu
an amount of $2,043.10. Plaintiff (Appellant) agreecl
to make all payments on this bill. Also he was to be
awarded the 1964 Dodge Truck, although title was to
be withheld from him until all bills covered by the
Stipulation were fully paid.
Plaintiff in Divorce action (Appellant) \Vas to sig11
a Promissory Note in the amount of $1265.85, carry
6% interest and payable at the rate of $50.00 per month.
Plaintiff (Appellant) was to pay off a family
obligation to First l<'ederal Savings and Loan Association for siding on Defendant (Respondent's) home
in the amount of $1,379.83; and also a family obligation
to City Finance Company of .Murray in the amount
of $471.64 as the balance due on an Encydopedia set
and a color T.V.
Defendant (Respondent's) Social Security check
payable to her as a widow was cancelled upon her marriage. It could be reinstated when the divorce became
final, so until that time, a cash monthly alimony of
$100.00 per month ·was to be paid by Plaintiff (Appellant).
The Stipulation contained this further provision:
"Plaintiff hereby assumes and agrees to pay in full all
of these obligations. and will not allow them to become
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delinquent and will save the Defendant harmless from
any suit or action appertaining to any or all of those
three bills."
This Stipulation was made a part of the Divorce
Decree granted on the 27th day of October, 1965.
It is significant to note that Plaintiff (Appellant)
paid a small amount on the Promissory Note and finally
turned over his equity in the Dodge truck to meet this
obligation. The evidence does not show that he made
a single payment, however, on the other three obligations. Finally, the Bank repossessed the automobile
about two months before Appellant filed for bankruptcy, much to the discomfort of the Respondent, who
had to quit her out-of-town employment for lack of
transportation. (Tr. p. 11, 12). She then had to cash
in an insurance policy to pay off the siding obligation
to the Savings and Loan Co. (Tr. p. 6) and had to
make back payments current and thereafter, make
monthly payments at the Finance Co.

Appellant, without making payments on the three
obligations, filed for bankruptcy on July 28, 1966. His
only creditors listed in the bankruptcy petition were
the three covered by the Stipulation and Divorce Decree
to Zion's }"'irst National Bank, First Federal Savings
and Loan, and City Finance Co. of Murray, and one
small additional bill to Dr. Kent Davis for dental work
(lune to Appellant's son Phillip in the amount of $84.00.
(Tr. p. 15).
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'Vhen Appellant refused to reimburse Respondent on these obligations, a complaint was filed, and
action started to force payment.
Appellant answered alleging the obligations were
discharged in bankruptcy. Various motions were heard
and aP amended complaint filed prior to trial. Respondent also remarried shortly before trial time.
At the non-jury trial before Judge .Maurice Harding, the Court gave Judgment to the Respondent on
three causes of action, after dismissing the Cause of
Action on the note as having been satisfied.
The Findings of Fact by the Trial Court pertinent
to the issues in question are as follows:
1. That during the month of September, 196.'i,

Plaintiff and Defendant e'ntered into a stipulation and
settlement agreement in their divorce action. Such
stipulation was accepted by the Court and made a part
of the f~indings and Decree of Divorce in Civil Case
No. 28,806, and were signed by Judge R. L. Tuckett
on the 27th day of October, 1965.
2. That the Defendant, without having made any
payments on the obligations covered in Plaintiff's 2nd,
3rd, and 4th Causes of Action, filed for Bankruptcy
on the 28th day of July, 1966, and listed therein, as
being all of his debts, the obligations contained in the
above-mentioned stipulation and Decree which constituted Plaintiff's 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Causes of Action
herein, together with only one other debt, a $84.00 bill
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to Dr. Davis, a dentist for dental work done on Defcudanfs own son.
Second Cause of Action
4. That the Defendant, under the terms of the

Stipulation and Decree above-mentioned, agreed to
pay in full an obligation with the :First }"ederal Savings
and Loan Association for siding on Plaintiff's home at
Lehi, Utah, with a balance owing of $1,379.83. That
the Defendant defaulted in the payment of this account,
making it necessary for the Plaintiff to completely
pay off the account, which was done on July 7, 1966,
for a settlement figure of $1,225.34, and thereby making Plaintiff entitled to interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from July 7, 1966, and further interest upon
the total award from date hereof until paid at the rate
of 8% per annum.
5. That the Defendant filed for Bankruptcy on
the 28th day of July, 1966, and listed the obligation

coyered in Plaintiff's 2nd Cause of Action, but that said
obligation, incurred originally for siding for Plaintiff's
home at Lehi, Utah, is for Maintenance and Support
of Defendant's wife, and is not a provable debt which
would be dischargeable under Section I 7 of the Federal
Bankruptcy Act.
Third Cause of Action
6. That the Defendant, under the terms of the

Stipulation and Decree above-mentioned, agreed to pay
7

in full an obligation to the City Finance Company of
.Murray for a set of encyclopedias and a television set,
in the amount of $471.64. That the Defendant defaulted
in the payment of this account, making it necessary for
the Plaintiff to completely assume this obligation, and
thereby making Plaintiff entitled to interest thereon
from the date of said stipulation, September 16, 1965
at the rate of 6% per annum on $471.64, and further
interest upon the total award from date hereof until
paid at the rate of 8% per annum.
7. That the Defendant filed for bankruptcy on
the 28th day of July, l!J66, and listed the obligation

covered in Plaintiff's 3rd Cause of Action but that said
obligation is for :Maintenance and Support of Defendant's wife in the manner to which Plaintiff was
accustomed, and is not a provable debt which would be
dischargeable under Section 17 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act.
Fourth Cause of Action
8. That the Defendant under the terms of the

stip~lation and decree above mentioned agreed to pay
in full an obligation with Zions First National Bank
for a 1065 Yaliant Automobile which was essential for
Plaintiff's family use and employment, with a balance
owing of $2,043.10. That the Defendant defaulted i11
the payment of this account, and said Company came
and repossessed said automobile, thus causing a loss to
Plaintiff of $2 ,043. l 0, together with interest thereon

8

as the payments fell due in the amount of 6% per annum, and further interest upon the total award from
<late hereof until paid at the rate of 8/1c per annum.
That the Defendant filed for bankruptcy on
the 28th day of July, 1966, and listed the obligation
i11 Plaintiff's 4th Cause of Action but that said obligation is for .Maintenance and Support of Defendant's
wife in the nature of a necessary family vehicle, and is
not a prornble rlebt which would be dischargeable under
Section 17 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act.
U.

STATE~IENT

OF POINTS

Throughout the remainder of this brief, Defendant
will be referred to as Appellant and Plaintiff as Respondent. Respondent will argue the Appellant's points
in the order in which they appear in Appellant's brief.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD AND
THE APPLICABLE LAW SUPPORTS THE
TRIAL COURT FINDING THAT THE
0 B L I G A T I 0 N S TO FIRST FEDERAL
SAYINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, CITY
FINANCE COMP ANY OF MURRAY, AND
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK ARE FOR
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l\IAINTENANCE AND SUPPORT OF THE
RESPONDENT AND THEREFORE NOT
DISCHARGEABLE IN BANKRUPTCY.
Section 17 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act,. Title
11, Bankruptcy Section 35, U.S.C.A., contains the following provision:
"Debts not affected by a discharge. a. A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt
from all of his provable debts, whether allowable
in full or in part, except such as ( 1) ... ; (2)
... or for alimony due or to become due, or for
mamtenance or support of wife or child, ... "
A definition of the word "support" might be helpful to the Court in arriving at its decision. Ballentine's
Law Dictionary, 2nd Edition, states: Support "means
maintenance, subsistence, or an income sufficient for
the support of a family, and maintenance means sustenance, support by means of supplies of food, clothing, and other conveniences."
The Respondent maintains and the District Court
so held, that the obligations incurred during the marriage of the parties hereto for siding for the home, set
of encyclopedias and television set, and automobile
were for maintenance and support of Appellant's wife.
"\Ve are concerned with the facts as they existed
at the time Appellant and Respondent entered into a
Stipulation, paving the way a short time later for a
Divorce Decree.
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After two years of marriage to Appellant, the
Hcspondent no longer possessed approximately $4,700.00 she had prior to marriage. All was gone, and in
addition, three sizeable family obligations had been incurred, all of which were to have been paid out of his
wages. The following testimony was given at the trial:
(l\Ir. Hinton) "Q Now, these bills, when
they were incurred, were they family obligations?
(Irene Erickson Robison)
( .l\Ir. Hinton) "Q
of his wages?"

"A

Yes."

Were they to be paid out

(Irene Erickson Robison)

"A

Yes."

(l\Ir. Hinton "Q Did you have any way, on
your own, of paying them?"

(Irene Erickson Ro bison) "A
p. 29).

No." (Tr.

She was not trained for employment outside of
the home, and thus, without help, could not provide for
her needs. Also her minor son had a heart ailment and
was unable to work. (Tr. p.18) .
In addition, Respondent had mothered and cared
for Appellant's two minor sons during all of this period,
and all lived in her home.
This home was livable, although it needed painting, but rather than paint, Appellant talked Respondent into having siding placed on it instead, thus incurring the indebtedness to First Federal Savings and
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Loan Co., on which there was $1,379.83 still due. ('l'r.
p. 29, 30).
Respondent, at the time of marriage, owned a
1962 Valiant, which was fully paid for. The addition
of her new husband and two step-sons to the family
made the car small for the family needs, and so it was
traded in on the 1965 Yaliant Station Wagon. The
indebtedness thus incurred was the $2,043.10 owed to
Zions F'irst National Bank. (Tr. p. 11) .
During the marriage, a color TV set and encyclopedia set were purchased for family use and enjoyment
and financed through City Finance Company of l\Iurray. The balance owed was $471.64.
It should be observed that all three obligations at
the time of the divorce in no way enhanced or increased
Respondent's standard of living, but simply continued
it in the manner to which she had been accustomed.
Her sole living was calculated to be her small
Social Security check, after it was reinstated, unless
she could find employment. There was no way she could
have paid off these three obligations.
The follmving statement from the record is enlightening:

( l\lr. Hinton) "Q 'Vhen the Stipulation was
entered into in regard to the Divorce action,
would you have been able to maintain yourself
out of what you were receiving if he failed to
pay these obligations?"
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(Irene Erickson Robison) "A

No."

(:Mr. Hinton "Q 'Vhen yon entered into this
agreement, what did you have in mind?"
(Irene Ericbon Robison) "A \Vell, I figured he would pay those bills like the Stipulation
ordered him to."
( .l\Ir. Hinton) "Q
get along?"

And you felt you could

(Irene Erickson Robison) "A And I felt I
could get along on the Social Security if I had
no bills to pay." (Tr. p. 19).
Appellant has attempted to make a strong issue of
the fact that the payments promised to be made in the
divorce stipulation closely approximately the $4700.00
plus odd dollars Respondent had at the time of marriage, and thus was a reimbursement and property
settlement rather than for support and maintenance.
The best answer to this argument is in the testimony of the Respondent, who was a party to the divorce.
(~Ir. Hinton) "Q
Now, on cross-examination, you indicated that this settlement was to
reimburse you for funds that you had before the
marriage. 'Vas there more involved to it than
that?"

(Irene Erickson Robison) "A Well, yes.
The money that I had spent on his bills, and
that, there was the interest on that that I figured in on that,too."
(l\Ir. Hinton) "Q
and maintenance?"
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And what about support

(Irene Erickson Robison) "A
,,·hat you mean."
(~Ir. Hinton) "Q
tion to support you (
decision?"

1 don't gel

'Vhat about his obligaDid this figure in your

(Irene Erickson Robison) '·A Yes, became
you just can't maintain a place on that small
amount of money that I was getting."
( .l\Ir. Ilinton) "Q
payment?"

This was uot only a re-

(Irene Erickson Robio-;on) "A It was for
support. Actually, you can't mamtam a house
and that on $160.00 a month, and pay your utilities and everything." (Tr. p. 30, 31).
In the case of In re Hollister, (DCNY 1942)
17 I•""'. Supp. IJJ., aft" d per curiam, ( CCA-2, 1943) 132
F. 2nd 861, it was held that:
"Although a bankupt's indebtedness

to his

wife as it existed prenous to an adjudication in

bankruptcy would haYe been discharged by the
bankruptcy, -when the parties agreed that payment of the indebtedness should serve to release
the bankrupt from his duty to support his wife,
upon the granting of a diYorce, it no longer constituted payment of a simple debt, for the debt
had been converted into a contract for the maintenance and support of the wife within the meaning of Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act."
See also Battles
2nd 794.

Y.

Battles, (Okla. 1952) 239 P.

8B - Corpus Juris Secundum, 4<8 Bankruptcy Paragraph 570:
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"lJ nder the Bankruptcy Act, a discharge in
Bankruptcy does not release the bankrupt from
a debt for alimony due, or to become due, or for
ma!ntenance or support of his wife or child,
claims of this nature come within the exception,
even though they have been embodied in agreements between the parties, and even though they
have been reduced to judgment.

Claims under agreements for maintenance
and support are within the exceptions even
though the agreement contains other features not
falling strictly within the exception; .
"
The matter of Avery (C.C.A. 6th, 1940) 44 Am.
B. R .. (N.S.) 168, 114 F. 2nd 768, states as follows:
"\Vhere a judgment against the bankrupt in
favor of his divorced wife represented the
amount of arrears due under a divorce decree
which confirmed a "property settlement" between
the parties, and such settlement contract shows
that the amounts to be paid thereunder were
intended for alimony and for the support and
maintenance of the wife, the bankrupt cannot
successfully contend that such judgment was
discharged in bankruptcy."
Nadler' s "The Law of Bankruptcy", 2nd Edition,
Paragraph 791, page 661, states:
"Akin to claims for alimony are liabilities for
the 'maintenance or support of wife or child'. 141
Date of payment with reference to divorce or
to bankruptcy is immaterial. 142 Nor does it matter whether the obligation is made part of a
Court decree143 or is the subject matter of a
settlement agreement between husband and
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y;·ife. 144

He.re, too, there is no merger iuto a

sub~equent judgment, and the Court may go

belund the .Judgment. 14 '' Since the liability for
maintenance or support is not a debt, b~1t i.)
founded upon a legal duty, it is still such 311
un.dischargeable obligation, even though the
child whose maintenance is involved is illegitimate and the order to pay was issued in a bastardly proceeding".146
Another fact stands out in the events which brought
about this lawsuit, the bankruptcy filing on the part
of the Appellant. It occurred on July 28, 1966. However, from the date of the Divorce Stipulation in September, 1965, until the bankruptcy filing, there is no
eYidence that he paid any payments on the three accounts. Also, these three bills and one other, a small
dentist bill for $84.00 for work done on his own son's
teeth, constitute all of the creditors listed in the bankruptcy proceeding. One could easily surmise that he
entered into the stipulation in bad faith, never intending to pay, and imposing the entire burden of family
support and maintenance and debts upon Respondent.
A summary of the opinion in the case of In Re
.Martin, United States District Court, Southern District, Central Division (July 14, 1964) C.C.H. Section
.J.1-13, Case No. 61,138, states as follows:
"A bankrupt was denied an injunction to stay
state court proceedings which were instituted by
his former '" ifo to collect monthly payments pro·
vided by the property settlement agreement in
their divorce action where the language of the
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agreement was in effect an agreement for support and not a division of community property
as labeled and where there was strong evidence
that the bankrupt had not acted in good faith.
Three weeks af tcr the divorce the bankrupt filed
a voluntary petition of bankruptcy, listing his
former wife as the only creditor. Until the diYorce had been made final he had regularly paid
the $500 per month amount stipulated in the
property settlement agreement. The bankrupt
contended that because the payments due were
labeled property settlements and was part of
a division of community property that the payments due should have been discharged with
the filing of bankruptcy and that his former
wife should be enjoined from bringing suit to
collect these payments. The court rejected this
contention on several grounds. First, the bankrupt had "unclean hands", because he filed his
petition in bankruptcy in bad faith. The bank·
rupt was not insolvent at the time of filing, and
he attempted to transfer title to a piece of property valued at $4000 to his attorney for $900
consideration seven days before the filing of the
petition. He also had $900 in cash on his person
when he listed his wife as the only creditor to an
amount of $345. The court said that they would
not interfere in his behalf or grant him any relief,
because he had violated the moral concepts of
good conscience. The court also denied relief on
the basis of its interpretation of the property
settlement agreement under the Bankruptcy
Act."
Appellant's efforts in his brief to discount this
Court's ruling in the case of Lyon vs. Lyon (1949)
115 L1'tah 466, 206 P. 2nd 148, are of no avail. His
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attempts to distinguish are without merit as they endeavor to circunffent the natural and legal duty the
husband has to support his wife.
The Lyon case seems to be directly in point with
the fact situation of the present case. The Court's determination that even though a divorce decree provided
for a property settlement in accordance with the stipulation of the parties, such property settlement was really
an award for the support and maintenance of the defendant's wife "in the nature of alimony" and therefore
the obligation thereunder was not discharged in bankruptcy. This would also seem to be a proper determination in the instant case.
On the other hand, Appellant's reliance upon the
more recent Utah case of Fife vs. Fife ( 1954), 1 Utah
2nd 281, 265 P. 2nd 642, comes through a misinterpretation of the reason for the Courf s decision. The
fact of the matter is that there was never a valid marriage and hence no duty or requirement of alimony,
support or maintenance. The ostensible marriage relationship "\Vas severed by an annulment rather than
by diYorce. Naturally, under these particular facts, the
obligations would be dischargeable in bankruptcy.
Hov,ever, the decision would undoubtedly have been
entirely different had the marriage been valid rather
than void.
The Court concluded its decision with this statement, "\\Te confine our conclusion to the facts of this
case alone", ... Thus, there was no effort to overrule.
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distinguish, or even criticize the Court's 1949 ruling
in the Lyon case,and, therefore, it still stands.
Appellant, if the cases are properly understood,
Jias no Gtah authorities to back up his position, and
the decisions from other states should not be too persuasive. It should be noted, too, that most of Appellant's
out-of-state citations are very old: In Re Ostrander,
139 F. 592 ( 1905); Schellenberg v ..Mullaney, 112 App.
Div. 384, 98 N.Y.S. 432, ( 1906); In Loman v. Locke,
134 N.E. 343, (1921) or were from California.
The quoted California case in Appellant's brief,
Smalley Ys. Smalley ( 1959) 176 Cal. App. 2nd (Adv.
4U2) , 1 Cal R ptr 440, and is the principal case in 74
ALR 2nd 756, states:
'·It has been squarely held in California that,
where the parties have entered into a property
settlement agreement whereby payments are
thereafter to be made to the wife, 1Wt for support
but in settlement of property rights, the discharge in bankruptcy of the husband discharges
the debt."

This citation gives the other California cases cited
in Appellant's brief as following this same rule: Tropp
v. Tropp, 129 Cal App 62, 18 P 2nd 385; Fernandes
v. Pitta, 47 Cal App 2nd 248, 117 P 2nd 728. In the
latter case, it "stated in paragraph 15 that the contract
'~·as made 'solely for the purpose of settling rights of
property and support which arise between the parties
on account of their present separation'."
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In contrast the California rule as held in Remondino 1. Remoudiuo, 41 Cal. App. 2nd 208, 106, P 2nd
~37, as that:
·'An alimony judgment or a judgment which
can properly be constr.ued as being for alimony
zs nut affected by a discharge in bankruptcy."
Also, the annotation in 7 4 ALR 2nd 760, states:
'·E,,.en though the agreement between the
spomes was called a property settlement and
\Vas referred to a.c, such in the decree din!l'cmg
the parties, the obligation thereunder "·as held
not dischargeable in bankruptcy, where th·
agreement '"as m substance one f•ff mainteua111:r
and support." I3lair v. Blair ( 10-11) -1-! Cal App
2nd 140, 112 P2nd 39.
The contrasting rules seem to be as stated i!: ·n
A.L.R. 2nd 759, paragaraph 2 (a):
"In a number of cases it has been held or recognized that a property settlement agreement
between spouses is dischargeable in bankruptc:·.
at least where it is truly or substantially a property s~ttlement agreement, an? not an a*'reement
for alnnony. support or mamtenance.
Paragraph 2 (b) states:
"But where the agreement is substantially une
for alimony, maintenance, or support, it ha,
been held or recognized that the obligation thereunder is not dischargeable in bankruptcy.''
These cases all turn on a clearly established prop·
erty settlement, whereas Respondent maintains in the
instant case that it was not a property settlement but

was in the nature of support and maintenance. In light

1Jf facts of this ease, and all of the cases and the texts
cited, the Court ''··ould have more than ample support
to rule that Appdlant's obligations could not be discharged by his filing for bankruptcy.

POINT II
THE OBLIGATIONS SUED UPON BY
THE RESPONDENT 'VERE NOT IN THE
~ATURE
OF PROPERTY SETTLEMENT
AG-REEl\IENTS AND THE COURT DID NOT
ERR 'VHEN IT FOUND THAT SUCH OBLIGATIONS 'VERE FOR SUPPORT AND l\IAINTENANCE OF THE RESPONDENT, THAT
StTCH OBLIGATIONS 'VERE NOT DISCHARGED BY THE BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS.
There is no question but what an agreement was
made in this case, later being embodied in a written
stipulation and then in the Divorce Decree. Respondent
differs from the Appellant's interpretation in that the
payments were always considered by the Respondent
to be essential for her solvency and living. She had no
job, was unskilled and had no income except from
:1ocial security, which was barely enough to make ends
meet. She should not possibly have paid these family
obligations. This was not the settlement of a simple
O'.::bt, but the agreement converted it into a contract
fr·r maintenance and support.
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Another factor is also significant. Appellant
promised, under the terms of the stipulation and diYorce decree, to "saye Plaintiff (Respondent) harmless from any suit or action" appertaining to these three
family obligations. In Appellant's answer filed in the
District Court, and which is a part of the record nm1
before the Court in the appeal, the Defendant (Appellant) admitted in each of these three causes of actiou
that this "save harmless" provision would apply. Respondeut maintains that this "save harmless" provision
is an additional reason why these obligations \\'ere debts
not pro-rnble in bankruptcy since the "save harmless"
clause \rnuld not take effect until the principal obligations were actually discharged by bankruptcy and
Respondent had paid or assumed them.
The case of Steele v. Georgia Fina nee, Inc., .5::3 Ua.
App. 5-t.a, 8G S.E.580, states:
"A debt which is not provable is not dischargeable in bankruptcy. Thus. the obligation of a
surety on a forthcoming bond is not a provable
debt. and hence not dischargeable in bankruptcy,
where the petition in bankruptcy of the Surety
was filed before the bre~ich of the bond."
Numerous cases ha Ye held that settlement agreements in diYorce cases may be considered as maintenance and support, and therefore not dischargeable.
Some of these cases are as follows:
In Poolman v. Poolman ( C.A. 8th, 1961) 289 F
(2nd) 332, the Court held :
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"that a state Court judgment against a hushand enforcing the terms of a property settlement whereby the husband was to make the necessary payments on a note secured by '·a trust
deed on the home which she had been awarded
,~.:as a non-dischargeable debt since the obligation to maintain and support a family 'includes
the obligation to keep a roof onr their heads.' "

In a case similar to Poolman and following its doc-

trine, the Court said:

"that while household furniture and an automobile (payments on which were required to be
made by the diYorce agreement) may not be
quite so basic as a roof over the wife's head, they
partake of the same nature." In re Baldwin
(D. Neb. HW6) 2.50 F. Supp. 533.
Henson v. Henson, ~Io. App. 1963, 366 S.W. 2nd
1, states:
""There property settlement agreement is substantially for alimony, maintenance or support,
husband's obligation thereunder is not dischargeable in bankruptcy, and such is true even though
property rights are adjusted between the parties
for the purpose of furnishing that support."
Also:
"It is not only alimony and maintenance in
conventional form that is not released by a discharge in bankruptcy, but all obligations for
maintenance and support of wife or child,
whether denominated alimony or maintenance
by statute or created by agreement of the parties."
U.S. In re Adams, C.C.A. N.Y. 25 F. 2nd 640,
states:
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"A husband's deht, under contract before 1livorce to pay annuity to his wife, is not released
by discharge, being 'liability for maintenauee
of wife'."

U.S. In re Runge, D.C. N.Y. 15 F. Supp. 31,
states:
"'Vhere separation agreement obligated husband to pay wife lump sum i11 monthly installments and gave wife right to declare all installments due on default in one installment, and
wife obtained judgment for all installmenb on
default, full amount due under agreement was
due her for maintenance at her death, and hence,
no part of Judgment was dischargeable in bankruptcy."
N.Y. D'Andria Y. Hegeman, 2 N.Y.S. 2nd 832,
253 App. DiY.518, motion denied, 4 N.Y.S. 2nd 376,
25.J. App. DiY. 662, affirmed in N.E. 2nd 294, 278 N.Y.
630, quotes:
",\n agreement whereby husband promised to
pay former ,,ife stated sum b~- weekly payments
in discharge of debt, and also in lieu of payments
for maintenance and support was contract for
maintenance or support of wife unaffected by
his discharge, notwithstanding benefits inure to
wife's estate on her death, since payments were
not payments of simple debt."
In Re Alcorn (D.C. Cal. 1958) 162 F. Supp. 206,
CCI-I Dec. 59, 285, states:

"A bankrupt's alimony liability to his former
wife, since the agreement entered into at tht
time of the di.-orce and denominated 'property
settlement agreement', is one which emborlie~,
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withm its terms the common-law or statutory
duty, and consequently is essentially a contrac't
for maintenance and support."
Again we wish to emphasize that the facts of this
particular case would take the stipulation out of the
~imple debt or property settlement category and make
it a contract for support and maintenance. While the
dirnrce was granted to the appellant, he was able to
obtain it only after negotiations and agreement with
Respondent. Thus Appellant's repeated statements in
his brief that because he obtained the divorce the "Court
was not obligated to make any award for support" (Tr./1
p. 8. 21) are obviously in error.
The Court's Findings of Fact entered on April 7,
196 7, and signed by Judge l\!Ia urice Harding held :
( 5) ... "Said obligation incurred originally for siding
for Plaintiff's home at Lehi, Utah, is for maintenance
anrl support of Defendant's wife, and is not a provable
debt which would be dischargable under Section 17 of
the Federal Bankruptcy Act."
That the obligation for a set of encyclopedias and
television set is: ( 7) . . . "for maintenance and support of Defendant's wife in the manner to which Plaintiff was accustomed, and is not a provable debt which
would be discharged under Section 17 of the Federal
Bankruptcy Act."
(9) . . . said obligation is for maintenance and

support of Defendant's wife in the nature of a neces5ar~· family vehicle, and is not a provable debt which
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.i.

would be dischargeable under Section 17 of the Federal
Bankruptcy Act.''
The aboYe stated Findings of Fact were supported

by abundant competent evidence.

Over the years it has been the consistent ruling
of the Court that the Supreme Court cannot disturb
the trial Court Findings of Fact if there is any competent evidence to support the Findings.
Nagle v. Club Fontainbleau, 405 P.2d 346, 17 Ctah
2nd, 125:
"Pr::sumptions are in fovor of Trial Court's
Findings and .T udgment, and burden is on appellant to show to contrary.''
lVeight v. ·Miller, 396 P.2d 626, 16 Utah 2nd.

112:

"Findings and J udgml'.nt supported by substantial evidence cannot properly be disturbed."
Lake v. Pinder, 368 P.:2nd 593, 13 Utah 2nd.76.
"If there is substantial evidence furnishing
rrn:.;onable basis in support of lower Court's
Findings, when eYidence is viewed most favorable to Findings, Judgment based thereon must
be affirmed."
Thorley v. Kolob Fish & Game Club, 373 P.2nd
574, 13 Utah 2nd. 294:
"Reviewing Court could not disturb Findings
supported by substantial evidence."
Lowe v. Rosenlof, 364 P.2nd. 418, 12 Utah 2nd

190:

"Court's :F'indin.as
,.., of Fact will not be disturbed
as long as they are supported by substantial evi'
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dence, and Findings of lower Court must be
affirmed unless there is no reasonable basis in evidence."
See also the following cases:
Charlton v. Hackett, 360 P.2nd. 176, II Utah 2nd.
389:

Parrish v. Tahtaras, 318 P.2nd. 642, 7 Utah 2nd.
87:

Dalton v. Dalton, 307 P.2nd 894, 6 Utah 2nd. 136,
l\Ialstrom v. Consolidated Theatres, 290 P.2nd.
689, 4 Utah 2nd. 181.
It has been further held in Rummell v. Bailey, 320
P.2nd. 653, 7 Utah 2nd. 138, that:
"Upon review of determination of issues of
Fact, all the e,·idence and every inference and
intendment fairly arising therefrom should be
taken in the light most favorable to the Finding
made by the Trial Court. And if when so viewed,
there is substantial support in the evidence for
the Finding made, it should not be disturbed."
CONCLUSION
For the reasons herein stated, the Judgment of the
Lower Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
HARV ARD R. HINTON
Attorney for Respondent
46 West Main
Lehi, Utah
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